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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Timothy A. Kellis appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho Court of Appeals described the facts and course of proceedings 
underlying Kellis' convictions as follows: 
Kellis was initially charged with ten counts of lewd and 
lascivious conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18-
1508, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child, I.C. § 18-1506, for 
misconduct with teenage boys, much of which occurred at a Boy 
Scout camp where Kellis was a staff member. Subsequently, one of 
the ten lewd conduct counts was amended to attempted lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen, I.C. §§ 18-306 and 18-1508. 
Kellis pleaded not guilty to all charges and went to trial before a 
jury. He was found guilty of all counts. The district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of life with fifteen years fixed for each 
of the nine counts of lewd conduct, fifteen years with five years 
fixed for the count of attempted lewd conduct, and twenty-five years 
with fifteen years fixed for each of the two counts of sexual abuse. 
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 813-814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1175-1176 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
After the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences 
(lg_,_), Kellis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.14-52). 
The district court appointed counsel, and later substitute counsel, to represent 
Kellis. (R., Vol. I, pp.156-159, 166-167, 186-188.) Through appointed counsel, 
Kellis filed an amended and second amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.190-197; Vol. II, pp.313-320.) Kellis asserted 12 claims of 
1 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and one claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. (R., Vol. II, pp.313-320.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of Kellis' petition, asserting that 
Kellis failed to allege facts that would entitle him to relief under the applicable 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) standard as to any of his 
claims. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-232. 1) The district court granted the state's motion. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.425-441.) Kellis timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp.442-445.) 
1 The state moved to dismiss Kellis' first amended petition for post-conviction 
relief. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-232.) Kellis subsequently filed a second amended 
petition in which he alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution as well as the United States Constitution. 
(See 10/16/12 Tr., R.., Vol. 11, pp. 313-320.) The state did not file an additional 
response or motion to dismiss with regard to the second amended petition, but 
referred to its previous brief in the hearing on its motion to dismiss the second 
amended petition. (10/16/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-21.) 
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ISSUE 
Kellis states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Kellis's petition 
without proper notice per I.C. § 19-4906(b)? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Kellis failed to show the district court dismissed his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on grounds entirely independent from those set 
forth by the state in its motion for summary dismissal? 
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ARGUMENT 
Kellis Has Failed To Show The District Court Dismissed His Ineffective Assistance 
Of Counsel Claims On Grounds Entirely Independent From Those Set Forth By 
The State In Its Motion For Summary Dismissal 
A. Introduction 
Kellis contends that the district court summarily dismissed four of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on grounds distinct from those set forth 
by the state in its motion for summary dismissal, thus depriving him of required 
notice. (See generally Appellant's brief.) However, a review of the record reveals 
that the district court dismissed Kellis' claims on substantially similar grounds as 
set forth by the state - that Kellis failed to allege facts satisfying the applicable 
Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Further, even if 
the court did dismiss the petition entirely independent grounds, any such error is 
harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
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C. The District Court Dismissed Kellis' Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claims On Substantially Similar Grounds As Set Forth By The State 
The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily 
dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (Ct. App. 2010). The procedure for summary 
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is 
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." kl 
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on 
its own motion, a petitioner is entitled to notice of the basis for the dismissal, and 
20 days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b). If the state moves to dismiss, the motion 
serves as notice for which petitioner may respond under I.C. § 19-4906(c). Buss 
v. State, 147 Idaho 514,517,211 P.3d 123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). The petitioner is 
entitled to a twenty-day period of time to respond to the state's motion. State v. 
Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981); Isaak v. State, 132 
Idaho 369, 370, 972 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Ct. App.1999). If the district court 
dismisses on grounds other than those articulated in the state's motion, the 
petitioner must be given additional notice and an opportunity to respond pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-4906(b). kl 
In Kellyv. State, 149 Idaho 517,236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court clarified the distinction in post-conviction appeals between a claim of 
insufficient notice of the grounds for summary dismissal, and a claim that there 
was no notice of the grounds for summary dismissal. An appellant may not 
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challenge the sufficiency of the notice contained in the state's motion for 
summary disposition and accompanying memoranda for the first time on appeal. 
!s;L at 521-522, 236 P.3d at 1281-1282 (citing DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009)). An appellant may, however, assert for the first 
time on appeal that he did not receive any notice of dismissal, i.e., that the district 
court dismissed the petitioner's claims on grounds entirely independent from the 
ground he was provided notice of in the state's motion and supporting briefs. !s;L 
In Kelly, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellant failed to show 
the district court dismissed the post-conviction claims on entirely independent 
grounds where the state provided the applicable Strickland ineffective assistance 
of counsel standard,2 cited Idaho law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims; and where the district court held that "Kelly has not provided specific facts 
to show that [Kelly's attorney's] behavior fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable representation, and that such a claim was 'unsupported by the 
record."' !s;L at 522-524, 236 P.3d at 1282-1284. The Idaho Supreme Court also 
held that "[w]hen a trial court summarily dismisses an application for post-
conviction relief based in part on the arguments presented by the State, this is 
sufficient to meet the notice requirements." !s;L at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283 
(emphasis in original, citations omitted)). 
In the present case, because Kellis failed to preserve any claim that the 
state's motion to dismiss provided insufficient notice of summary dismissal, he 
2 Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), a post-
conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate 
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
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must meet the more stringent standard of showing that the district court 
dismissed the claims in question on entirely independent grounds than set forth 
by the state. Kellis cannot make such a showing. 
The state moved for summary dismissal of Kellis' post-conviction petition 
on December 13, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.198-233.) Prior to discussing Kellis' claims 
individually, the state cited the applicable Strickland standard and cited Idaho law 
relating to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (R., Vol. I, pp.203-208.) The 
state concluded, "Kellis' claims fail to raise any genuine issues of material fact 
regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice." (R., Vol. I, p.221.) 
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, the state further 
summarized, "[i]t's not a key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a 
long series of examples how the case might have been tried better." (2/12/13 Tr., 
p.18, Ls.19-22.) 
On April 10, 2013, after the submission of additional argument and 
evidence (R., Vol. II, pp.325-388, 419-422), the district court summarily 
dismissed Kellis' petition. (R., Vol. II, pp.425-441). After addressing each of 
Kellis' claims individually, the court summarized that Kellis "has not presented 
any claims that raise a question of fact as to both prongs of the Strickland test." 
(Id.) Kellis thus had notice of the court's grounds for dismissal: that he failed to 
allege facts, which if true, would satisfy the Strickland standard. 
A review of the individual claims at issue further demonstrates that the 
district court dismissed the claims on substantially similar grounds as set forth by 
the state. While the district court, in some instances, approached the Strickland 
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analysis in different ways than did the state, the court's reasoning for dismissal 
was not so distinct as to transform its decision into a sua sponte dismissal that 
required additional notice. 
1. Trial Counsel's Failure To Present Evidence That The Victims 
Previously Made A Timely Accusation Of Sexual Misconduct 
Against The Camp Director 
In his first post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence that the victims made 
allegations of sexual misconduct against the camp director the previous summer. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.314-315.) Such evidence, Kellis argued, "would have had a very 
significant effect on the credibility" of the victims. (Id.) In support of this claim, 
Kellis submitted a copy of a letter he claims to have sent the summer before he 
was charged, in which he discussed the accusations made by some campers 
against the camp director. (R., Vol. 11, pp.314-315, 335-336.) 
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state questioned the 
authenticity of the letter, and argued that even to the extent the letter and the 
assertions contained within were genuine, they did not support Kellis' claim that 
his trial counsel's performance was deficient. (R., Vol. I, pp.209-210.) 
Specifically, the state noted that not all of the victims were mentioned in the letter, 
and that the accusations contained within the letter were relatively benign relative 
to Kellis' conduct (i.e., that the camp director looked and entered into campers' 
tents without permission.) (R., Vol. I, pp.209-210.) 
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court 
concluded that Kellis failed to sufficiently allege facts that would satisfy the 
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Strickland standard with regard to this claim. (R., Vol. II, pp.429-430.) 
Specifically, the court concluded that Kellis both failed to adequately support the 
factual allegations underlying the alleged counsel deficiency, and failed to assert 
prejudice. (Id.) The district court also pointed out that the prior accusations 
made against the camp director were discussed at trial, and were referenced 
during Kellis' closing argument. (Id.) 
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds 
as set forth by the state. Both the district court and the state characterized the 
letter as having minimal exculpatory value. This characterization addresses both 
prongs of a Strickland analysis - because the exculpatory value of the letter was 
at best, minimal, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to investigate the matter 
further; and neither the letter nor further investigation of the accusations would 
have resulted in an acquittal. Therefore, Kellis has failed to show that the district 
court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely independent of those set forth by 
the state. 
2. Trial Counsel's Failure To Obtain The Assistance Of An Expert To 
Examine The Conduct Of The Victims 
In his third post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness to examine the conduct of the 
four victims "with respect to their failure to make their allegations until 
approximately eight months after the alleged events in light of their having made 
similar accusations the prior year." (R., Vol. II, p.316.) In other words, Kellis 
argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to retain an 
expert to attack the victim's credibility. 
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In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that Kellis' 
allegation was "speculative, bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact, and 
[was] inadequate to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing." (R. Vol. I, p.213.) The 
state also argued that Kellis failed to identify how the lack of calling an expert to 
examine the behavior of the victims adversely effected his case. (Id.) The state 
thus touched upon both prongs of Strickland, in that it asserted that Kellis' 
allegations were insufficient to establish trial counsel was deficient, and that he 
failed to assert prejudice. 
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court similarly 
found that Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the deficiency prong of 
the Strickland test by failing to present evidence that counsel's decision was 
based upon "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or some other 
objective shortcoming." (R., Vol. II, p.432.) 
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds 
as set forth by the state. Both the district court and the state recognized that 
Kellis failed to establish a prima facie case with regard to the alleged deficient 
performance of his trial counsel. Therefore, Kellis has failed to show that the 
district court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely independent of those set 
forth by the state. 
3. Trial Counsel's Failure To Obtain An Expert To Determine Whether 
There Was DNA Or Other Physical Evidence On The Property Of 
the Victims 
In his seventh post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to retain an expert to determine whether there was any 
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physical evidence, such as Kellis' DNA, on any of the victims' property, including 
their sleeping bags. (R., Vol. 11, p.317.) 
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that Kellis' 
allegation was "speculative, bare, conclusory, unsubstantiated by any fact, and 
[was] inadequate to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing." (R., Vol. I. p.215.) The 
state also pointed out that not all of the incidents of Kellis' sexual misconduct 
took place in the boys' tents, and there was no testimony or other evidence of 
ejaculation. (Id.) 
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the district court similarly 
found that Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the deficiency prong of 
the Strickland test, in that in that he failed to present evidence that counsel's 
decision was based upon "any objective shortcoming." (R., Vol. II, pp.434-435.) 
The district court also pointed out that a significant amount of time passed 
between the sexual misconduct and the filing of criminal charges, which limited 
the potential usefulness of scientific testing, since "DNA not appearing the 
following April would have had little effect on the trial." (Id.) 
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds 
as set forth by the state. Specifically, both the state and the district court 
characterized any potential DNA testing as having limited exculpatory value. This 
characterization pertains to both prongs of a Strickland analysis. Because the 
absence of Kellis' DNA in the tents or sleeping bags would have had minimal 
exculpatory value, Kellis' trial counsel was not deficient to decline to retain an 
expert for the purpose of finding such evidence, and further, Kellis cannot show 
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that such evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. Therefore, Kellis has 
failed to show that the district court dismissed this claim on grounds entirely 
independent of those set forth by the state. 
4. Trial Counsel's Failure To Call A Witness To Contradict Certain 
Testimony, And Failure To Object To That Testimony 
In his ninth post-conviction claim, Kellis asserted his trial counsel was 
ineffective for: (a) failing to call a particular witness to contradict testimony that 
Kellis provided alcohol to one of his victims, and (b) failing to object to such 
evidence on relevance grounds. (R., Vol. 11, pp.317-318.) 
In moving for summary dismissal of this claim, the state argued that the 
evidence that Kellis provided alcohol to one of the victims was relevant to 
demonstrate Kellis' grooming behavior. (R., Vol. I, pp.216-217.) The state also 
asserted Kellis failed to demonstrate either deficiency or prejudice with regard to 
his trial counsel's failure to object to the victim's testimony about alcohol because 
evidence of Kellis' guilt was overwhelming, and because exclusion of the 
testimony would not have impacted the outcome of the trial. (Id.) 
In its order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition, the court concluded that 
Kellis failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the Strickland test with regard to his 
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony 
contradicting the victim's testimony. (R., Vol. 11, p.437.) Specifically, the court 
found that any evidence that Kellis had not provided alcohol to one of the victims 
would have "had very little, if anything, to do with the results of this trial." (Id.) 
The district court thus dismissed this claim on substantially similar grounds 
as set forth by the state. On appeal, Kellis contends that the state expressly 
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discussed only counsel's failure to object, while the district court expressly 
discussed only counsel's failure to present contradictory testimony. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.9-10.) However, while the state focused its argument on counsel's 
failure to object, the heading of the relevant section of the motion expressly 
refers to Kellis' other sub-claim, that counsel failed to present contradictory 
testimony. (R., Vol. I, p.216.) In any event, the rationale of the state and the 
court overlapped to a significant degree. Both the state and the court recognized 
that in the grand scheme of the facts adduced at trial, evidence that Kellis 
supplied one of the victims with alcohol during a trip, while relevant, had minimal 
inculpatory value. (R., Vol. I, pp.216-217; R., Vol. II, p.437.) Therefore, Kellis 
could not show that testimony contradicting that assertion, or even a successful 
objection to the testimony, would have resulted in an acquittal. 
Kellis has failed to show that the district court summarily dismissed any of 
the four challenged claims on grounds entirely independent from those set forth 
by the state. He has therefore failed to show that he had no notice regarding the 
summarily dismissal of these claims. 
D. Even If The District Court Dismissed the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims on Entirely Independent Grounds, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
If a petitioner is "not left with an 'invisible target' and is able to respond in 
a meaningful way to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss," then any lack 
of adequate notice is harmless. Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 422-423, 128 
P.3d 948, 958-959 (Ct. App. 2005); see also Franck-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 
671, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Nevertheless, if Franck-Teel's response to 
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the state's motion for summary dismissal reveals that she understood the basis 
for dismissal. .. , then we will conclude that the inadequacy of notice was harmless 
error."). 
In this case, to the extent the district court's expressed rationale for 
dismissal was so distinct from the grounds set forth by the state as to render the 
court's order a sua sponte dismissal, any such error is harmless. Kellis had full 
opportunity to present evidence and argument as to how he could satisfy the 
deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland. Further, Kellis has not attempted 
to describe what type of argument or evidence he would have presented if only 
he had more precise notice of the grounds for the district court's dismissal of 
these claims. Finally, Kellis' response to the state's motion for summary 
dismissal reveals that he did understand that the basic grounds for the claims' 
ultimate dismissal was application of Strickland, as opposed to timeliness, or 
waiver, or any other grounds. (See R., Vol. 11, pp.390-416.) 
Because Kellis was not left with an "invisible target," and had the 
opportunity to respond in a meaningful way to the state's argument that he had 
failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the Strickland standard as to any 
of his claims, any error regarding required notice of the summary dismissal of 
those claims is harmless. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Kellis' petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2014 
MARK W. OLSON I 
Deputy Attorney General 
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